Secure communication over mobile ad-hoc network by Zhang, Zhenfei
University of Wollongong 
Research Online 
University of Wollongong Thesis Collection 
1954-2016 University of Wollongong Thesis Collections 
2009 
Secure communication over mobile ad-hoc network 
Zhenfei Zhang 
University of Wollongong 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ro.uow.edu.au/theses 
University of Wollongong 
Copyright Warning 
You may print or download ONE copy of this document for the purpose of your own research or study. The University 
does not authorise you to copy, communicate or otherwise make available electronically to any other person any 
copyright material contained on this site. 
You are reminded of the following: This work is copyright. Apart from any use permitted under the Copyright Act 
1968, no part of this work may be reproduced by any process, nor may any other exclusive right be exercised, 
without the permission of the author. Copyright owners are entitled to take legal action against persons who infringe 
their copyright. A reproduction of material that is protected by copyright may be a copyright infringement. A court 
may impose penalties and award damages in relation to offences and infringements relating to copyright material. 
Higher penalties may apply, and higher damages may be awarded, for offences and infringements involving the 
conversion of material into digital or electronic form. 
Unless otherwise indicated, the views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not necessarily 
represent the views of the University of Wollongong. 
Recommended Citation 
Zhang, Zhenfei, Secure communication over mobile ad-hoc network, ME-Res thesis, School of Electrical, 
Computer and Telecommunications Engineering, University of Wollongong, 2009. http://ro.uow.edu.au/
theses/839 
Research Online is the open access institutional repository for the University of Wollongong. For further information 
contact the UOW Library: research-pubs@uow.edu.au 

Secure Communication over Mobile Ad-hoc Network
A Thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of
the requirements for the award of the degree









I, Zhenfei Zhang, declare that this thesis, submitted in partial fulfilment
of the requirements for the award of Master of Engineering by research, in
School of Electrical, Computer and Telecommunications Engineering, Uni-
versity of Wollongong, is wholly my own work unless otherwise referenced
or acknowledged. The document has not been submitted for qualification at
any other academic institution.
i
Acknowledgements
I would like to thank Dr. Raad Raad and A.Prof Willy Susilo, my supervi-
sors, for their patient guidance and constant support. I admire Dr. Raad’s
knowledge in telecommunication and appreciate him taking me into the area
of mobile ad hoc networking. I also respect A.P. Susilo’s knowledge in cryp-
tography field, and appreciate him guiding me in the right direction.
I would also like to thank my parents, who support me constantly with




Zhenfei Zhang, Willy Susilo and Raad Raad, ”Mobile Ad-hoc Network Key
Management with Certificateless Cryptography”, In Proceeding of the In-





1.1 Motivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.2 The Challenges and Solutions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.3 Contribution of Thesis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.4 Thesis Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2 Key Management Schemes Review 6
2.1 Pre-established Key Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.1.1 Key Distribution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.1.2 Key Exchange . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.2 Distributed System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2.2.1 Public Key Cryptography with Distributed System . . 11
2.2.2 ID-based Cryptography with Distributed System . . . 14
2.2.3 Drawbacks of Distributed Models . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
2.3 Transitive Trust Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
2.3.1 Mobility-based Key Management . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
2.3.2 Certificate Chain-based Key Management . . . . . . . 17
2.4 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
3 Secure Routing Protocols Review 23
iv
3.1 ARAN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
3.2 SAODV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
3.3 Ariadne . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
3.4 SLSP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
3.5 SEAD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
3.6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
4 Certificateless Cryptography over MANET 35
4.1 Certificateless Cryptography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
4.2 Generic Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
4.2.1 Fully Distributed System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
4.2.2 Partially Distributed System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
4.3 Detailed Scheme . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
4.4 Issues and Design Principles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
4.5 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
5 Secure Routing Protocol 46
5.1 OLSR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
5.1.1 Basic Mechanism of OLSR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
5.1.2 Remaining Problems of OLSR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
5.2 Reputation System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
5.3 Reputed-OLSR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
5.3.1 Assumptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
5.3.2 Generic Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
5.3.3 Detailed Protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
5.4 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
6 Security Issues 58
6.1 Fake Route Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
v
6.2 Man in the Middle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
6.3 ID Stealth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
6.4 Pseudo Spoofing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
6.5 Whitewashing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
6.6 Shilling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
7 Simulation and Results 63
7.1 CL-PKE Over MANET . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
7.1.1 Simulation with C . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
7.1.2 Simulation with OPNET . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
7.2 Rep-OLSR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
7.2.1 Simulation against Whitewashing Attacks . . . . . . . 71
7.2.2 Simulation with OPNET . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
8 Conclusions 78




2.1 Key Distribution in Partially Distributed Model . . . . . . . . 13
2.2 Certificate Graph G [16] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
2.3 3 Steps to Establish a Certificate Chain [16] . . . . . . . . . . 19
5.1 Network Setup . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
5.2 Neighbour Discovery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
5.3 Polling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
5.4 TC Message Forwarding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
7.1 Simulation Results of CL-PKE over MANET with OPNET:
10 Users, Packet Dropped . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
7.2 Simulation Results of CL-PKE over MANET with OPNET:
10 Users, Route Discovery Time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
7.3 Simulation Results of CL-PKE over MANET with OPNET:
10 Users, Packet Send . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
7.4 Simulation Results of CL-PKE over MANET with OPNET:
10 Users, Packet Received . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
7.5 Simulation Results of CL-PKE over MANET with OPNET:
20 Users, Packet Dropped . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
7.6 Simulation Results of CL-PKE over MANET with OPNET:
20 Users, Route Discovery Time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
vii
7.7 Simulation Results of CL-PKE over MANET with OPNET:
20 Users, Packet Send . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
7.8 Simulation Results of CL-PKE over MANET with OPNET:
20 Users, Packet Received . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
7.9 Simulation Results of Rep-OLSR over MANET with OPNET:
20 Users, Routing Delay . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
7.10 Simulation Results of Rep-OLSR over MANET with OPNET:
20 Users, Hello Message . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
7.11 Simulation Results of Rep-OLSR over MANET with OPNET:
20 Users, MPR Count . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
7.12 Simulation Results of Rep-OLSR over MANET with OPNET:
20 Users, Traffic Dropped . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
7.13 Simulation Results of Rep-OLSR over MANET with OPNET:
20 Users, Traffic Received . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
7.14 Simulation Results of Rep-OLSR over MANET with OPNET:
20 Users, TC message forward . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
viii
List of Tables
3.1 RREQ and RREP in ARAN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
5.1 MRP Reputation Table, Stage 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
5.2 MRP Reputation Table, Stage 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
5.3 MRP Reputation Table, Stage 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
6.1 Six Types of Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
7.1 Programming Environment for Key Generation . . . . . . . . 63
7.2 Simulation Results of CL-PKE over MANET with C . . . . . 64
7.3 The AODV Parameters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
7.4 Programming Environment for Simulation against Whitewash-
ing Attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
ix
Abstract
A Mobile Ad-hoc Network (MANET) is an ideal network that merely con-
sists of mobiles devices without any pre-established infrastructure. However,
the secure communication over a MANET is not straightforward. In this
thesis, we present a solution for MANET secure communication. Gener-
ally speaking, it covers two main areas, namely key management and secure
routing.
In the key management area, we present an idea of adopting certificate-
less public key encryption (CL-PKE) schemes over mobile ad hoc network
(MANET), which have not been explored before. In the current litera-
ture, there exists two main approaches, namely public key cryptography
and identity-based (ID-based) cryptography. Unfortunately, they both have
some inherent drawbacks. To avoid these obstacles, Al-Riyami and Pater-
son proposed certificateless cryptography systems. In this thesis, we adopt
Al-Riyami’s advantage over MANET. To implement CL-PKE over MANET
and to make it practical, we incorporate the idea of Shamir’s secret sharing
scheme. The master secret keys are shared among some or all the MANET
nodes. This makes the system self-organized once the network has been initi-
ated. In order to provide more flexibility, we consider both a full distribution
system and a partial distribution system.
In the secure routing area, we present the idea of adopting a reputation
system over the optimized link state routing (OLSR) protocol. In the liter-
ature, there exists two main routing approaches, namely proactive routing
and reactive routing. Several secure reactive routing protocols have been
proposed. However, as far as proactive routing is concerned, few secure pro-
tocols are presented, yet they all possess different drawbacks that make them
only practical on certain routing protocols. One of major problems is how
to determine whether a node is worthy of trust or not. In other networks,
for example, peer-to-peer sharing networks, reputation systems are designed
to judge users. Unfortunately, they are designed specifically for peer-to-peer
systems, while the adoption to MANET is not very straightforward. To this
end, we present our Rep-OLSR, which selects routes wisely based on users’
former performance by periodically collecting polling results from neighbour
nodes.
Finally, we demonstrate that our solution is robust against several types of
attacks. We also test our solution with several simulations. The results of the
simulations indicate that our solution efficiently secure the communication
with little extra traffic compared with pure MANET routing protocols.
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